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ABSTRACT	
Ashley	Gerow:	Responsibility	to	protect:	human	rights	or	our	interests	
Under	the	direction	of	Aleksander	Lust	
	
	
This	thesis	was	written	to	redefine	successful	humanitarian	intervention	under	my	own	
criteria.	By	analyzing	the	course	of	action	of	two	notable	humanitarian	intervention	campaigns,	
Kosovo	and	Libya,	I	argue	that	both	were	humanitarian	failures	and	did	not	prevent	a	further	
humanitarian	crisis.	My	conclusion	of	failure	in	regards	to	intervention	in	Kosovo	contradicts	
popular	literature	on	the	intervention,	and	I	highlight	the	intervention	in	Libya	as	being	the	
cause	of	the	current	humanitarian	crisis	in	the	region.	My	critiques	and	criteria	present	an	
alternative	way	of	examining	military	campaigns	in	the	name	of	humanitarian	intervention	and	I	
propose	relying	on	civilian	organizations	to	conduct	humanitarian	aid.			
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Chapter	One:	Introduction	
Humanitarian	intervention	is	the	use	of	an	external	military	force	to	combat	human	
rights	violations.	The	charter	of	the	United	Nations	(UN)	explicitly	identifies	inalienable	human	
rights	and	requires	its	member	states	to	uphold	these	rights,	whether	at	home	or	abroad.	The	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	includes	thirty	articles	explaining	the	rights	
internationally	agreed	to	belong	to	every	human;	it	states	that	these	fundamental	human	rights	
are	to	be	universally	protected	because	they	are	“the	foundation	of	freedom,	justice	and	peace	
in	the	world	(The	United	Nations	1948).”	By	emphasizing	human	rights,	humanitarian	
intervention	in	the	form	of	military	intervention	allows	states	an	opportunity	to	involve	
themselves	in	other	state’s	internal	affairs.		
Throughout	this	thesis,	I	will	argue	that	humanitarian	intervention	of	the	modern	era	is	
repeatedly	unsuccessful	and	an	alternative	way	of	states	conducting	military	campaigns	against	
a	perceived	security	risk.	My	criteria	for	determining	success	is	it	must	be	legal,	prevent	further	
loss	of	life,	and	facilitate	political	stability.	In	order	for	an	intervention	to	be	legal,	it	must	
receive	Security	Council	approval,	and	in	some	cases	intervention	has	been	conducted	without	
approval	making	the	campaign	unable	to	be	truly	successful	from	the	beginning.	I	have	
identified	preventing	loss	of	life	as	a	guideline	for	success	because	intervention	in	the	name	of	
protecting	civilians	from	oppression	and	loss	of	life	should	not	result	in	further	deaths.	For	
intervention	to	be	successful,	the	loss	of	life	must	be	minimized	in	the	sense	that	there	should	
be	an	immediate	end	of	intentional	civilian	causalities	by	the	adversary.	Finally,	in	order	for	
intervention	to	be	successful	it	must	end	with	the	state’s	government,	whether	permanent	or	
interim,	possessing	the	capability	to	be	secure,	functional,	and	stable.	If	intervention	causes	a	
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failed	state,	it	does	not	provide	a	long	lasting	stability	or	protection	for	the	civilians	of	the	
region	and	is	laying	the	foundation	for	a	subsequent	humanitarian	crisis.		
Humanitarian	Intervention:	History	and	evolution		
The	United	Nations	(UN)	was	established	following	the	Holocaust,	which	is	often	viewed	
as	one	of	the	worse	human	rights	violations	in	the	world,	as	a	method	of	international	
cooperation.	The	UN	replaced	the	ineffective	League	of	Nations	and,	in	order	to	be	more	
effective,	had	an	extensive	charter	and	a	functioning	Security	Council.	The	Security	Council	
explicit	powers	and	functions	all	revolve	around	the	emphasis	on	international	peace	and	
security.		The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	was	signed	in	to	authority	on	December	
10th,	1948,	however,	the	contemporary	notion	of	humanitarian	intervention	did	not	come	to	
the	forefront	until	the	1990s.	Following	the	implementation	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	
Human	Rights,	the	understanding	and	need	for	protecting	human	rights	was	expanded	through	
several	milestones:	the	1948	Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	of	
Genocide;	the	two	1966	Covenants	relating	to	civil,	political,	social,	economic	and	cultural	
rights;	and	the	adoption	in	1998	of	the	statute	for	the	establishment	of	an	International	
Criminal	Court	(Hubert	and	Weiss	2001).	Unfortunately,	these	additions	often	coincided	with	
other	humanitarian	crises,	and	citizens	of	the	international	community	are	not	equally	
protected	from	human	rights	violations.			
Acts	of	aggression	between	societies	has	existed	since	the	beginning	of	civilization.	
Typically	described	as	war	between	empires,	kingdoms,	or	religions,	conflict	is	seen	throughout	
history.	Within	the	same	history	lies	the	origins	of	humanitarian	intervention.	As	is	the	nature	
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of	international	law,	the	history	of	the	doctrine	outlines	the	loose	definition,	loose	
interpretation,	and	loose	constraints	that	have	constructed	the	modern	understanding.	As	said	
by	P	H	Winfield	(1922);		
The	subject	of	intervention	is	one	of	the	vaguest	branches	of	international	law.	We	are	
told	that	intervention	is	a	right;	that	it	is	a	crime;	that	it	is	the	rule;	that	it	is	the	
exception;	that	it	is	never	permissible	at	all.	A	reader,	after	pursuing	Phillimore’s	chapter	
upon	intervention,	might	close	the	book	with	the	impression	that	intervention	may	be	
anything	from	a	speech	of	Lord	Palmerston’s	in	the	House	of	Commons	to	the	partition	
of	Poland.	
Often,	the	righteousness	of	intervention	has	been	determined	by	those	intervening.	With	that,	
there	must	be	a	distinction	made	between	humanitarian	intervention,	and	other	forms	of	
justification.	When	a	sovereign	intervenes	in	order	to	protect	nationals,	it	is	justified	through	
the	right	of	self-preservation,	self-defense,	or	necessity	(Brownlie	1963).	Acting	in	self-defense	
is	not	bound	by	the	same	standard	as	intervening	based	on	humanitarian	intentions.	The	
evolution	towards	humanitarian	intervention	is	most	notable	during	the	Middle	Ages	through	
interpretations	of	the	writings	of	prominent	scholars	and	theologians.	The	father	of	
international	law	and	order,	Hollander	Hugo	Grotius	(1583-1645),	pulled	from	the	laws	of	
nature	to	construct	an	international	society	bound	by	the	laws	of	nations	(Chesterman	2001).		
	 Grotius	was	writing	during	some	of	the	bloodiest	years	of	European	history.	Kingdoms	
were	continuously	fighting	over	religious	differences,	and	often	citing	a	precursor	to	
humanitarian	intervention	based	on	their	orders	from	God.	Grotius	was	one	of	the	first	people	
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to	argue	that	war	was	not	just	solely	on	the	basis	of	religious	differences,	an	idea	that	would	be	
incorporated	into	the	drafting	of	the	Treaty	of	Westphalia.	He	wrote	on	a	variety	of	topics	
regarding	just	and	unjust	war	from	what	is	permissible,	inexcusable,	and	unavoidable.	Although	
Grotius	viewed	even	monstrous	acts	as	acceptable	during	a	just	war,	he	distinguished	between	
acts	that	occurred	during	a	war	with	just	cause	versus	one	of	indiscriminate	damage	with	unjust	
reasons.	He	places	accountability	on	those	who	were	leaders	of	war	rather	than	the	followers,	
protections	on	the	innocents,	and	limitations	on	the	damage	(Grotius	1625).	Several	hundred	
years	before	the	Geneva	Convention,	his	writings	were	far	from	that	of	a	humanitarian	
advocate,	but	his	ideas	would	lay	the	foundation	for	humanitarian	restraints	during	war.			
	 An	early	example	of	intervention	based	on	the	implied	international	responsibility	to	
help	those	being	oppressed	was	the	European	intervention	during	the	Greek	War	of	
Independence	between	1821-32.	During	the	bloody	war	for	independence,	both	sides	
committed	atrocities,	including	large	massacres,	but	the	Treaty	of	London	allows	for	western	
powers	to	intervene	to	“peacefully	secure	the	autonomy	of	the	Hellenes	(Frary	2013).”	The	
European	powers	saw	their	own	national	security	threatened	by	an	extensive	Ottoman	Empire,	
and	Great	Britain,	France,	and	Russia	sent	in	military	assistance	to	those	rebelling.	The	
European	intervention	allowed	the	Greeks	to	gain	an	advantage,	and	ultimately	the	European	
powers	presided	over	an	agreement	between	the	Turks	and	Greeks	establish	Greek	
independence.		
	 During	the	19th	century,	one	of	the	most	prominent	advocates	of	universal	human	
rights,	and	the	protection	of	civilians,	was	the	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross.	The	
founder	of	the	movement,	Jean-Henri	Dunant,	was	disheartened	by	the	slaughter	at	Solferino	in	
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1859	during	a	battle	between	Austria	and	France	(Dunant	1862).	Approximately	6,000	people	
died	in	one	day,	with	many	losing	their	lives	due	to	injury	or	illness,	rather	than	the	conflict.	
Several	years	later,	in	1864,	the	Geneva	Convention	was	signed	by	16	countries,	granting	
Dunant	and	his	organization	access	to	battlefields	and	warzones	under	a	protection	of	
neutrality	with	the	intent	to	provide	medical	assistance.	By	the	outbreak	of	World	War	I,	the	
ICRC	was	the	largest	humanitarian	organization,	and	by	1965	it	would	codified	its	work	
according	to	seven	principles	of	humanitarian	action:	humanity,	impartiality,	neutrality,	
independence,	voluntary	service,	unity,	and	universality	(Chandler	2002).	Universality,	
impartiality,	neutrality,	and	humanity	are	held	to	be	the	underlying	principles	of	humanitarian	
intervention	(Chandler	2002).	Impartiality	and	neutrality	separated	the	ICRC	from	the	politics	
and	‘sides’	of	conflicts.	They	would	provide	aid	to	all,	regardless	of	race,	ethnicity,	age,	gender,	
or	affiliation.	They	did	not	see	winners	or	losers,	only	victims.	Universality	and	humanity	
allowed	for	the	ICRC	to	have	international	clout.	Their	volunteers	were	prepared	to	provide	
medical	assistance	to	whoever,	wherever,	on	the	basis	that	human	rights	are	inalienable	and	
are	extended	to	those	participating	in	conflict.	While	the	notion	of	protecting	noncombatants	
through	intervention,	in	this	case	to	provide	medical	assistance,	was	becoming	increasingly	
important,	it	was	not	embraced	internationally	for	several	more	years.		
	 	Humanitarian	crises	continued	after	WWI	with	Nazi	Germany	and	the	Holocaust.	
Approximately	6million	Jews	died	during	Hitler’s	reign	of	terror	over	Europe.	The	death	toll	of	
the	Holocaust	climbs	when	considering	the	other	victims,	including	the	Roma,	disabled,	gays,	
Jehovah’s	Witnesses,	Poles,	Soviet	POWs,	and	political	prisoners.	It	was	following	this	dark	time	
in	history	that	the	international	community	embraced	the	responsibility	to	act	when	large	scale	
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human	rights	violations	are	being	undertaken.	However,	after	the	implementation	of	the	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	the	promise	to	protect,	humanitarian	intervention	
evolved	into	military	campaigns	that	produce	varying	outcomes	without	eliminating	the	threat	
to	civilians.			
This	thesis	examines	the	cases	in	which	military	action	has	been	utilized	under	the	
umbrella	of	humanitarian	intervention.	By	examining	each	case	through	the	lenses	of	the	three	
principles	I	have	constructed,	I	will	determine	success	as	conducting	intervention	in	accordance	
with	my	constraints.	Based	on	my	criteria	I	will	argue	that	although	intervention	is	Kosovo	and	
Libya	were	conducted	differently,	have	varying	levels	of	immediate	destruction,	and	drastically	
different	post	intervention	states,	they	have	both	been	failures.	Ultimately	I	will	determine	
whether	humanitarian	intervention	is	truly	an	act	based	on	the	protections	of	human	rights	and	
international	security,	or	if	states	are	motivated	by	their	own	interests	and	their	own	security	in	
relation	to	the	country	they	are	intervening	in.			
Literature	Review:	Analyzing	criteria,	theories,	and	implications		
Humanitarian	intervention	as	a	means	of	military	intervention	is	not	a	concrete	notion	
abiding	by	specific	criteria	and	definition.	Rather	it	has	evolved	from	a	notion	that	
indiscriminate	damage	and	loss	of	human	rights	is	not	permissible	by	a	sovereign	or	during	
wartime;	however	interventionists,	who	are	acting	under	its	pretense,	have	caused	immense	
damage	during	their	campaigns.	Throughout	this	thesis,	I	will	argue	that	whether	or	not	
interventionists	led	successful	campaigns	based	on	my	established	criteria.	Prior	to	outlining	my	
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criteria	for	success,	I	researched	other	scholar’s	opinions	and	have	included	a	synopsis	of	their	
literature	as	further	evidence	for	my	own	criteria.		
When	researching	preexisting	criteria	for	successful	humanitarian	intervention	I	have	
found	a	variety	of	responses	–	each	with	their	own	implications.	The	writings	of	Gareth	Evans	
and	Mohamed	Sahan	(2002)	provided	a	thorough	set	of	guidelines	for	determining	success	that	
covers	justifications,	morality,	proportionality,	and	reasonableness.	Their	six	principles	are	just	
cause,	right	intention,	last	resort,	proportional	means,	reasonable	prospects,	and	right	
authority	(2002).	While	their	criteria	highlights	many	variables	present	during	intervention,	I	
believe	their	principles	are	to	lengthy	to	be	applicable	as	well	as	subject	to	opinion.	Last	resort	
and	right	intention	are	fluid	notions	and	different	states	and	organizations	could	discredit	the	
others	reasoning.		
Due	to	the	complex	nature	of	humanitarian	intervention,	determining	criteria	and	
assessing	the	success	or	failure	of	these	campaigns	is	open	to	interpretation.	According	to	
Taylor	Seybolt,	success	is	solely	determined	by	the	lives	it	saves.	“To	be	more	specific,	if	in	
humanitarian	crisis	some	people	would	have	died	without	assistance,	but	did	not	because	of	
the	actions	of	military	personnel,	the	intervention	succeeded	(2015).”	Although	Seybolt	
elaborates	further,	he’s	concise	determinate	in	deciding	success	or	failure	does	not	take	into	
account	the	loss	of	life	that	follows	intervention	due	to	instability	or	reverse	oppression.	
Focusing	on	“lives	saved”	is	viewed	as	the	“lowest	common	denominator”	(2015)	across	
interventionist	campaigns	because	it	occurs	in	response	to	humanitarian	crisis	usually	
characterized	by	oppression,	massacre,	or	genocide.		
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Another	notable	determinate	for	evaluating	success	was	put	forward	by	Alex	Martins	
(2013)	and	emphasizes	the	aftermath	of	intervention.	He	identifies	political	stability	and	the	
resolution	of	the	conflicts	that	lead	to	intervention	as	the	criteria	for	success	(2013).	While	I	
agree	that	conflict	resolution	and	political	stability	are	incredibly	important	when	evaluating	a	
campaign,	I	believe	neglecting	the	loss	of	life	caused	by	intervention	reduces	the	need	for	
restraint.	If	interventionist	know	success	will	not	be	judged	based	on	their	ability	to	prevent	
loss	of	life,	they	will	not	need	to	conduct	their	mission	in	a	way	to	minimize	loss	of	life.		
Since	the	reintroduction	of	humanitarian	intervention,	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	
Organization	(NATO)	has	undertaken	several	operations	with	varying	degrees	of	success.	Later	
in	my	thesis	I	will	discuss	the	intervention	of	Kosovo	and	Libya,	but	I	will	argue	that	they	were	
both	unsuccessful	based	on	the	established	criteria	I	have	set	forth.		
To	provide	the	background	information	for	my	hypothesis,	I	will	explore	the	three	main	
theories	of	international	relations	as	well	as	leading	interpretations	of	them	and	their	
implications.	Understanding	the	theories	of	international	relations	provides	necessary	
background	information	for	understanding	how	the	international	system	works.	The	driving	
force	behind	state’s	interactions	with	one	another	is	its	own	national	interests,	and	these	
actions	fit	the	criteria	of	one	of	the	three	schools	of	thought,	realism,	liberalism,	and	
constructivism.			
With	much	of	the	literature	surrounding	humanitarian	intervention	being	based	on	a	
theory	of	international	relations,	I	feel	that	it	is	important	to	explore	the	principles	of	various	
theories,	their	implications	on	humanitarian	intervention,	and	emerging	variations	of	traditional	
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ideologies.	Although	I	am	judging	these	cases	with	my	criteria	previously	outlined,	these	
themselves	have	origins	in	theory	and	a	broader	understanding	of	these	theories	will	explain,	
justify,	and	validate	the	arguments	presented	by	those	who	are	pro	intervention	and	those	who	
are	against.			
Of	the	three	main	theories,	realism	takes	the	most	aggressive	stance	to	international	
affairs.	Understanding	the	actions	of	realists	has	been	summed	up	by	five	assumptions	
(Mearsheimer	2014):	
1. Great	powers	are	the	main	actors	in	world	politics	and	they	find	themselves	
in	an	anarchic	system.	
2. 	All	states	possess	offensive	military	capability.		
3. There	is	a	constant	state	of	uncertainty	between	states.		
4. The	main	goal	of	states	is	survival.		
5. States	are	rational	actors.		
Realism	is	determined	by	its	permanent	state	of	anarchy,	or	lack	of	central	authority.	Without	
an	overarching	“police	force,”	states	are	independent	to	act	as	they	please	without	true	
repercussions.	Although	there	are	institutions	that	attempt	to	regulate	the	international	
system,	the	true	sovereignty	of	a	state	is	undeniable,	and	to	maintain	its	position	a	state	must	
act	with	power;	military,	diplomatic,	or	economic.	That	power	is	often	exhorted	through	
military	force	and	many	cases	of	military	campaigns	can	be	understood	through	the	lens	of	
realism.		
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	 A	leading	scholar,	and	writer	of	Just	and	Unjust	Wars	(2006),	Michael	Walzer	is	a	strong	
advocate	of	state	sovereignty	and	the	lack	of	international	authority	to	intervene	in	internal	
affairs.	He	argues	that	citizens	should	be	free	under	the	confines	of	their	government	without	
foreign	interruption,	regardless	of	regime	type,	perceived	oppression,	or	international	
skepticism	(2006).	Walzer	only	allows	for	international	arbitration	on	the	grounds	of	
widespread	massacre	or	enslavement	of	the	citizens,	which	is	only	two	of	the	human	rights	
listed	on	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights.	With	the	roots	of	humanitarian	
intervention	being	in	explicit	human	rights	violations,	under	Walzer’s	understanding,	the	
interventions	in	Kosovo	and	Libya	were	illegitimate	and	illegal.		
	 While	realism	is	typically	viewed	as	a	theory	not	directed	by	ethics,	Martha	Finnemore	
presents	a	counter	argument	suggesting	that	when	viewed	through	a	more	“sophisticated	
understanding”	(2003)	realism	is	a	theory	of	ethics.	Finnemore	suggests	that	through	this	
understanding	it	is	possible	to	be	a	realist	and	pro	intervention.	She	believes	that	a	
fundamental	understanding	of	realism	can	be	summed	up	with	a	single	notion:	prudence	
(2003).	Prudence,	in	her	words,	is	“self-preservation”	and	goes	along	with	the	assumption	that	
realists	act	with	national	interests.	By	being	interested	in	the	self-preservation	of	a	nation,	
politicians	and	diplomats	act	prudentially	to	ensure	continued	safety	and	security.	To	act	with	
such	prudence	is	to	act	ethically,	making	intervention	ethical,	and	essentially	acceptable.		
	 Liberalism	takes	a	drastically	different	approach	than	realism.	It	does	not	identify	states	
as	all	powerful	but	rather	as	one	actor	of	many	in	world	politics.	Instead	of	arguing	that	states	
are	all	motivated	by	the	same	factors,	liberalism	emphasizes	the	importance	of	international	
institutions.	Through	this	school	of	thought	the	UN	was	created	and	the	states	that	have	
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ratified	its	charter	and	subsequent	documents	have	agreed	to	act	in	accordance	with	its	
guidelines.	Liberalism	focuses	on	civil	and	political	liberties,	government	through	the	consent	of	
the	governed	and	protection	from	brutal	authority.		
As	a	theory,	liberalism	views	international	law	as	sustainable	through	positive	acts	of	
state	consent.	It	is	the	corner	stone	of	the	United	Nations,	and	can	explain	the	humanitarian	
interests	of	states	when	public	opinion	shows	sympathy	to	international	crises.	In	liberalism,	
Andrew	Moravcisk	suggests	that	individuals	and	private	groups	are	the	driving	force	behind	
world	politics,	that	governments	serve	the	will	of	the	people,	and	their	preferences	determine	
relations	between	states.	
	 Liberalism	is	extremely	important	in	the	formation	of	institutions.	Not	all	institutions	
propelled	by	liberalism	are	international	organizations,	but	the	international	organizations	that	
subscribe	to	it	are	crucial	to	the	expansion	and	protection	of	human	rights.	Robert	Keohane	
attributes	three	advancements	to	the	expansion	of	liberalism:	
Since	the	early	1990s	we	can	observe	three	developments	of	note:	an	increase	in	
legalization;	increasing	legalism	and	moralism	expressed	by	people	leading	civil	society	
efforts	to	creates	and	modify	international	institutions;	and	a	decline	in	the	coherence	
of	some	international	regimes	with	a	failure	to	increase	the	coherence	of	others.	
These	three	notions	were	the	driving	force	behind	the	idea	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	(R2P)	
that	has	become	front	and	center	in	regards	to	interventions	within	sovereign	states.	R2P	was	
centered	on	moralism	and	an	embodiment	of	liberalism’s	school	of	thought.	While	R2P	
emphasizes	morality,	it	also	sidelines	legality.	
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	 Constructivism	is	the	third,	and	newest,	approach	to	understanding	international	
relations.	This	theory	emphasizes	that	actors	and	their	perceptions	are	more	influential	than	
the	anarchical	state	of	global	politics.	This	approach	is	less	concrete	and	embraces	the	idea	that	
states	can	change	their	positions,	attitudes,	and	actions	over	time,	directly	affect	the	making	of	
conditions	rather	than	accepting	preexisting	ones.	Similarly	to	liberalism,	constructivism	in	
international	relations	explain	states	actions	to	be	based	on	identity,	interests,	culture,	and	
relationships	between	states.	Instead	of	viewing	all	states	under	the	same	five	assumptions	as	
realist	do,	constructivists	view	some	states	as	friends	and	others	as	enemies,	and	treat	each	
according	to	its	label.	With	this	understanding	in	mind,	the	previous	discussion	of	Martha	
FInnemore	could	be	examined	as	a	constructivist	interpretation.		
	 Constructivist	believe	that	the	state	of	anarchy	is	a	condition	set	by	states	themselves	
and	will	continue	to	exist	until	they	decide	otherwise.	Constructivism	allows	for	more	
opportunity	to	interpret	actions	separately	and	through	these	interpretations	that	a	deeper	
understanding	of	relations	and	interactions	between	states	can	be	formed.	Constructivist	
allows	highlight	the	importance	that	leaders	play	in	international	politics.	Instead	of	viewing	
states	as	all	powerful	entities	that	have	their	own	wills,	constructivism	emphasizes	the	power	
that	a	leader,	or	policy	maker,	has	on	the	relationships	between	states.		
	 All	three	theories	subscribe	to	the	notion	that	the	international	system	is	anarchic.	
Within	this	anarchical	system,	they	take	different	approaches	and	attitudes.	If	there	was	no	
anarchy,	it	would	be	safe	to	assume	that	some	hierarchical	power	would	be	responsible	for	
ensuring	the	rights	and	protections	of	all	peoples.	Unfortunately,	this	is	not	the	case	and	people	
are	often	at	the	discretion	of	those	who	govern	them.	Humanitarian	intervention	is	seemingly	a	
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characteristic	of	the	liberalist	school	of	thought	because	intervention	post	WWII	has	been	
through	the	UN	or	NATO,	both	international,	intergovernmental	institutions.	However,	the	
actions	taken	under	the	pretext	of	humanitarian	intervention	have	resembled	full	scale	
invasions,	destabilizing	operations,	and	reigns	of	terror	on	civilian	populations.		
Stepping	away	from	an	emphasis	on	theory,	David	Gibbs	argues	against	humanitarian	
intervention,	or	what	he’d	prefer	to	call	“purported	humanitarian	intervention,”	based	on	its	
motives.	Gibbs	suggests	that	hegemons	only	conduct	military	operations	where	they	have	
economic	or	strategic	interests,	and	that	humanitarian	intervention	is	an	attempt	at	
justification.	In	his	book,	First	Do	No	Harm	(2009),	he	explores	his	understanding	by	critiquing	
U.S.	intervention	in	the	Balkans.	He’s	main	argument	is	that	humanitarian	intervention	is	an	
excuse	for	military	aggression	and	should	be	viewed	the	same	way	as	“Britain’s	‘white	man’s	
burden,’	France’s	‘mission	civilisatrice’,	and	the	Soviet	Union’s	‘defense’	of	the	Afghan	people	
(2009).”	Gibbs	has	also	contributed	critiques	directly	relating	to	Kosovo	and	Libya	which	I	will	
explore	in	their	respective	chapters.	
Elizabeth	Ferris	studies	the	protection	of	citizens	who	find	themselves	amidst	violence	
and	the	actions	of	various	humanitarian	actors’	in	the	protection	process.	While	she	does	not	
focus	on	the	morality,	legality,	and	justifications	as	critically	as	other	scholars,	her	ability	to	
explain	UN	Peacekeeping	missions	provided	essential	background	knowledge	to	my	own	
understanding	of	intervention	and	its	implications.	Published	in	2011,	her	writings	do	not	
reflect	the	intervention	in	Libya,	but	she	outlines	the	trend	that	UN	peacekeeping	missions	have	
continuously	expanded	their	amount,	size,	and	impact	(2011).	While	peacekeeping	missions	are	
not	the	type	of	intervention	that	I	am	exploring	in	my	thesis,	her	explanation	of	the	evolution	
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towards	humanitarian	intervention	was	vital	to	the	historical	background	I	provided.	For	the	
purposes	of	this	thesis,	Ferris	represents	the	opinion	of	someone	who	is	pro	intervention,	and	
while	I	will	continuously	argue	against	it,	I	believe	in	the	necessity	of	highlighting	both	sides.		
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Chapter	Two:	Kosovo		
The	breakup	of	the	former	Yugoslavia	led	to	the	formation	of	eight	new	countries	in	
Eastern	Europe.	Unfortunately,	the	transition	to	independence	was	marked	with	violence,	
oppression,	and	destruction	throughout	the	region.	Under	the	leadership	of	Slobodan	
Milosevic,	the	Serbian	government	decided	to	end	the	autonomy	of	Kosovo	in	1989	and	the	
conflict	that	followed	would	lead	to	the	intervention	of	NATO	in	1999.	In	this	chapter	I	will	
identify	the	pre-existing	regional	conflict,	outline	the	events	that	lead	to	NATO	intervention,	
and	the	consequences	of	NATO’s	campaign.	While	describing	how	the	events	unfolded,	I	will	
also	determine	whether	or	not	it	fits	my	criteria	for	successful	intervention.	
Foreshadowing	intervention		
	 The	former	Yugoslavia	was	a	region	of	many	ethnicities	and	religions	living	together	
relatively	peacefully	until	a	series	of	conflicts	in	the	1990s.	The	Dayton	Accords	of	1995	brought	
peace	to	the	region	temporarily	while	simultaneously	creating	new	divides	along	the	religious	
and	ethnic	lines	already	present	in	the	region.	Each	new	nation	had	its	own	path	to	
independence,	but	some	had	a	harder,	bloodier	fight	than	others.		
The	implementation	of	new	government	policies	saw	the	dissent	and	opposition	of	
Kosovar	Albanians	from	the	beginning.	Beginning	in	1987,	President	Milosevic	rallies	Serb	
nationalists	in	Kosovo	and	promises	to	defend	their	interests	in	the	providence	(Cousens	and	
Carter	2001).	Constitutional	changes	reduce	the	autonomy	of	Kosovo	and	places	restrictions	on	
“the	activities	of	their	cultural	organizations(2017).”	The	breakup	of	the	former	Federal	
Republic	of	Yugoslavia	(FRY/Yugoslavia)	began	in	1991	when	Slovenia	and	Croatia	declared	
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independence.	The	citizens	of	Bosnia	and	Albanians	in	Kosovo	attempted	to	break	away	as	well,	
but	war	erupts	over	Bosnia	and	the	Kosovars	are	reportedly	oppressed	further.	Ultimately		
Croatia,	Slovenia,	and	Bosnia	were	granted	international	recognition	but	Kosovo	would	remain	
under	the	control	of	the	former	Yugoslavia	(FRY).		
	By	December	1992,	the	U.S.	recognizes	the	potential	need	for	action	in	Kosovo	and	
President	Bush	issues	the	“Christmas	Warning”	to	President	Milosevic.	Through	the	“Christmas	
Warning,”	U.S.	policy	was	to	“remain	prepared	to	respond	against	the	Serbians	in	the	event	of	a	
conflict	in	Kosovo	caused	by	Serbian	action	(1999).”	The	policy	would	not	change	through	the	
election	of	President	Clinton,	who	stated,	“I	am	determined	to	do	all	I	can	to	stop	a	repeat	of	
human	carnage	in	Bosnia	and	the	‘ethnic	cleansing.’	And	I	have	authorized,	and	I	am	
supporting,	an	accelerated	planning	process	for	NATO	(1999).”	Milosevic	continued	his	
tyrannical	rule	of	the	Kosovars	and	a	nationalist	resistance	force,	the	Kosovo	Liberation	Army	
(KLA),	begins	fighting	back	in	1996	(Pierpaoli	2016).	The	KLA	operated	a	series	of	sporadic	
attacks	against	Serb	authorities	in	the	region	and	Milosevic	responded	through	further	
repression	of	student	and	ethnic	movements.		
In	1998,	the	Serbian	military	and	police	forces	engaged	in	open	conflict	with	the	Kosovar	
Albanian	forces,	signaling	the	escalating	conflict	within	Yugoslavia.	The	destruction	of	their	
autonomy	was	followed	by	the	murders	of	their	citizenry	which	was	portrayed	to	the	rest	of	the	
world	as	signs	of	ethnic	cleansing	in	the	region.	The	conflict	between	the	Serbian	and	Kosovar	
Albanian	forces	resulted	in	approximately	1,500	deaths	and	the	displacement	of	400,000	more	
(UNHCR	1999).		
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By	April	1999,	“the	United	Nations	High	Commission	for	Refugees	estimated	that	the	
campaign	of	ethnic	cleansing	had	resulted	in	226,000	refugees	in	Albania,	125,000	in	the	former	
Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia,	and	33,000	in	Montenegro	(UNHCR	1999).”	President	
Milosevic	disregarded	attempts	to	settle	the	conflict	through	diplomacy,	and	as	time	passed	the	
Kosovar	Albanian	resistance	became	increasingly	militant.	After	the	intervention,	investigators,	
reporters,	and	forensic	teams	came	into	FRY	and	the	surrounding	areas	to	conduct	research	
and	many	of	the	previous	reports	of	genocidal	actions	were	debunked.	
NATO	Intervention	
As	NATO	began	formulating	its	course	of	action	in	FRY,	there	were	clear	objections	from	
other	international	leaders.	Russia	and	China	expressed	concerns	regarding	the	operation	and	
would	not	give	their	approval;	therefore	the	NATO	intervention	in	Kosovo	did	not	have	Security	
Council	authorization	and	was	not	legal.	Regardless,	the	international	community	prepared	to	
implement	policies	to	end	Serbian	oppression,	and	the	objectives	of	intervention	were	laid	out	
in	the	April	1999	North	Atlantic	Council	meeting.	NATO’s	objectives	were	reaffirmed	by	the	
Heads	of	States	and	Government	and	were	defined	as:	
1. A	verifiable	stop	to	all	military	action	and	the	immediate	ending	of	violence	and	
repression.	
2. The	withdrawal	from	Kosovo	of	the	military,	police,	and	paramilitary	forces.	
3. The	stationing	in	Kosovo	of	an	international	military	presence.	
4. The	unconditional	and	safe	return	of	all	refugees	and	displaced	persons	and	
unhindered	access	to	them	by	humanitarian	aid	organizations.	
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5. The	establishment	of	a	political	framework	agreement	for	Kosovo	on	the	basis	of	
the	Rambouillet	Accords,	in	conformity	with	international	law	and	the	Charter	of	
the	United	Nations.		
These	five	objectives	were	reiterated	repeatedly	throughout	the	bombing	campaign,	Operation	
Allied	Force,	and	it	was	clear	that	the	campaign	would	not	end	until	President	Slobodan	
Milosevic	agreed	to	the	terms.		
The	bombing	campaign	conducted	by	NATO	was	the	first	major	use	of	destructive	
armed	force	with	the	intentions	of	implementing	UN	Security	Council	resolutions.	Although	the	
Security	Council	did	not	give	its	approval,	Operation	Allied	Force	was	still	carried	out.	China	and	
Russia	argued	that	NATO’s	military	campaign	was	illegal,	however	the	alliance	prepared	for	
intervention	anyways	and	reaffirmed	the	precedent	of	humanitarian	intervention	on	behalf	of	
the	oppressed	peoples.	Arguably,	NATO	was	acting	as	an	assisting	force	to	revolutionaries	
seeking	freedom	from	tyranny	and	authoritarian	repression.	
	 Reportedly,	the	Serbian	government	was	responsible	for	the	death,	displacement,	and	
harming	of	thousands	of	Kosovar	Albanians	during	the	years	of	oppression.	Reports	of	1	million	
people	were	displaced,	more	than	10	thousand	were	killed,	many	others	were	raped	and	
tortured,	and	many	saw	their	property	destroyed	or	confiscated	(UNCHR	1999).	The	ethnic	
cleansing	campaign	began	after	the	beginning	of	NATO	intervention	and	is	often	cited	as	the	
spark	for	the	beginning	of	the	cleansing	campaign.	The	Kosovo	Report	places	responsibility	on	
the	Belgrade,	but	does	attribute	the	bombing	campaign	as	an	external	factor	that	speed	up	the	
killing	in	Kosovo.	
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	 Correctly	labeled	as	a	bombing	campaign,	the	NATO	operation	that	launched	in	March	
1999	was	extremely	air	based.	When	the	air	campaign	was	suspended	in	June	1999,	the	allied	
forces	had	912	aircraft	and	35	ships	(Roberts	1999).	Throughout	the	78	days	of	airstrikes,	the	
allies	conducted	roughly	38,000	sorties,	an	attack	from	a	defensive	position,	with	more	than	
10,000	of	them	being	strike	sorties	(1999).	The	strikes	were	intentionally	carried	out	to	target	
the	Yugoslavia	air	defenses,	and	then	gradually	shifted	to	more	widespread	targets.	NATO	
extensively	reviewed	it’s	target	selection	to	“ensure	that	it	complied	with	international	law,	was	
militarily	justified,	and	minimized	the	risk	to	civilian	lives	and	property	(1999).”	However,	as	I	
will	explore	further	in	my	next	segment,	the	damage	inflicted	by	NATO	was	more	extensive	
than	limiting	to	military	targets	and	the	Serbian	oppression	was	less	deadly.	
Critiques		
	 Intervention	in	Kosovo	had	been	contested	since	before	NATO	deployed	its	forces	and	
since	disputed	due	to	moral	and	legal	objections,	and	accusations	of	inaccurate	information	
being	publicized.	World	leaders	tossed	around	words	including	genocide,	refugees,	and	human	
rights	violations	to	invoke	feelings	of	distress	and	need	by	the	Kosovar	civilian	populations.	
Investigations	after	the	campaign	brought	to	light	the	amount	of	misinformation	that	had	been	
shared	and	several	argued	that	they	were	falsely	given	information	to	ensure	their	support.	
	 News	of	the	genocide	occurring	in	Kosovo	against	the	ethnic	Albanians	was	broadcasted	
throughout	the	Western	world.	While	many	people	did	lose	their	lives	as	a	result	of	the	conflict	
between	the	Serbs	and	KLA,	the	Serbian	government	was	not	systematically	killing	Kosovars	
during	this	time.	Instead,	the	majority	of	deaths	were	a	result	of	the	shoot	outs	and	other	
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skirmishes	between	the	Serbian	army	and	police	and	the	insurgent	KLA.	While	it	is	true	that	the	
violence	the	KLA	resulted	in	further	Serbian	oppression,	the	death	toll	was	not	in	the	tens	of	
thousands	as	falsely	reported	by	the	New	York	Times	in	1999.	In	an	interview,	former	Canadian	
ambassador	to	FRY	stated	that	the	U.S.	and	NATO	intentionally	exaggerated	the	details	of	the	
crisis	in	the	Balkans	in	order	to	ensure	global	support	for	their	efforts.	Truly,	the	actions	of	the	
KLA	were	as	bad	as	the	Serbian	forces	that	were	being	labeled	war	crimes,	but	because	NATO	
chose	to	side	with	the	Kosovar	resistance	during	the	campaign,	there	actions	are	often	left	out	
of	the	literature	of	the	events.			
	 Morally,	humanitarian	intervention	through	extensive	bombing	campaigns	can	be	
viewed	as	counterproductive.	NATO	stated	that	their	campaign	would	solely	target	military	
capabilities,	but	as	the	intervention	continued,	they	expanded	their	targets	to	include	support	
infrastructure	and	industrial	components.	Throughout	the	campaign	the	Human	Rights	Watch	
was	on	the	ground	collecting	information	pertaining	to	civilian	causalities	and	they	concluded	
that	there	was	anywhere	from	489	to	528	civilians	killed	due	to	the	NATO	bombing.	In	official	
press	releases,	the	civilian	causalities	were	often	referred	to	as	collateral	damage,	a	label	that	
critiques	often	resonated	negatively	with	those	who	thought	military	intervention	for	the	sake	
of	protecting	human	rights	was	counterintuitive.		
	 Critiques	of	NATO	actions	in	Kosovo	did	not	emerge	solely	after	the	end	of	the	
campaign.	UN	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	Mary	Robinson,	criticized	the	operation	in	
her	report:	
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In	the	NATO	bombing	of	the	Federal	Republic	of	Yugoslavia	large	numbers	of	civilians	
have	incontestably	been	killed,	civilian	installations	targeted	on	the	basis	that	they	are	
or	could	be	of	military	application,	and	NATO	remains	the	sole	judge	of	what	is	or	is	not	
acceptable	to	bomb.	In	this	situation,	the	principle	of	proportionality	must	be	adhered	
to	by	those	carrying	out	the	bombing	campaign.	
Throughout	the	NATO	intervention,	she	made	further	statements	regarding	the	destruction	in	
Kosovo	and	rejected	her	peers’	notion	of	“collateral	damage.”			
	 The	idea	of	human	rights	violations	pulls	on	the	heart	strings	of	Western	diplomats	and	
they	feel	called	to	action,	but	none	of	the	NATO	member	states	are	interested	in	jeopardizing	
the	lives	of	their	citizens	to	undertake	these	operations.	In	the	case	of	Kosovo,	“it	was	an	
astonishing	achievement	to	engage	in	acts	of	war	against	a	well-armed	sovereign	state	for	11	
weeks	and	not	incur	a	single	combat	casualty	(Roberts	1999).”	Bombing	campaigns	have	taken	
the	place	of	boots	on	the	ground	and	diplomatic	efforts	and	have	large	scopes	of	damage	with	
little	to	no	repercussions.	These	campaigns	are	meant	to	target	military	objectives,	but	those	
objectives	are	loosely	defined	as	“object	which	by	their	nature,	location,	purpose	or	use	make	
an	effective	contribution	to	military	action	(HRW	2000).”	Arguably,	NATO	took	an	interest	in	
Kosovo	as	a	means	of	greatly	weakening	the	military	of	Serbs	rather	than	defend	the	citizens.	
Immediately	following	NATO’s	first	sortie,	the	Serbian	forces	began	attacking	and	displacing	
more	civilians	than	before.	The	refugee	crisis	cited	by	Western	leaders	did	not	exist	until	after	
the	beginning	of	NATO	bombardment.		
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	 Legally,	the	intervention	is	Kosovo	should	not	have	occurred	because	it	directly	violated	
international	law	and	precedent.	By	acting	without	UN	Security	Council	approval,	NATO	set	the	
precedent	that	simply	perceiving	a	human	rights	crisis,	whether	true	or	not,	would	be	enough	
for	full	scale	military	operations.	This	precedent	of	acting	outside	international	law	laid	the	
foundation	for	the	writing	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	(R2P),	which	broadened	the	criteria	for	
intervention	based	on	human	rights.		
	 The	NATO	intervention	into	Kosovo	allowed	for	Western	powers	to	solidify	their	ability	
to	violate	state	sovereignty	under	the	pretense	of	humanitarian	intervention,	which	would	later	
expand	to	include	the	“war	on	terror”	or	“preventive	war.”		
Application	of	thesis			
The	intervention	in	Kosovo	was	undertaken	under	the	pretense	of	“preventing	
instability	spreading”	throughout	the	region,	and	many	proponents	of	humanitarian	
intervention	have	deemed	the	campaign	a	success.	I,	however,	will	argue	that	the	intervention	
on	Kosovo	was	unsuccessful	because	it	failed	to	meet	two	of	my	three	criteria	for	success.		
NATO	began	Operation	Allied	Force,	the	alliance’s	first	use	of	military	force	against	a	
sovereign	state	that	did	not	pose	a	threat	to	any	of	the	alliance	members,	without	UN	Security	
Council	approval.	By	acting	without	approval,	the	alliance	violated	established	international	law	
and	acted	illegally.	I	believe	in	order	for	an	intervention	to	be	successful	it	must	be	legally	
undertaken	because	the	UN	was	established	to	mediate	conflicts	and	prevent	unnecessary	wars	
from	ripping	the	world	apart.	By	forsaking	the	legality	of	their	operation,	NATO	delegitimized	
their	campaign.	
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During	their	illegal	campaign	in	Kosovo,	NATO	forces	rained	bombs	down	on	Serbian	
forces	that	often	produced	“collateral	damage”	that	included	civilian	infrastructure,	including	
schools,	libraries,	and	hospitals,	as	well	as	civilian	casualties.	The	Human	Rights	Watch	was	not	
the	only	source	that	examined	the	civilian	death	toll	that	resulted	directly	from	NATO	bombing,	
the	UN	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	FRY	includes	details	regarding	several	incidents	that	
were	arguable	war	crimes.	I	will	focus	on	the	attack	of	a	civilian	passenger	train,	the	bombing	of	
the	Chinese	embassy,	and	the	attack	on	the	Korisa	Village.		
To	be	a	successful	campaign,	my	second	criteria	was	the	emphasis	that	interventionists	
could	not	be	responsible	for	the	death	of	non-combatants.	I	believe	that	the	resources	and	time	
should	be	expended	to	ensure	the	careful	vetting	of	targets	prior	to	attacks.	By	gathering	
further	knowledge	on	secondary	military	targets	(those	that	do	not	fit	the	description	of	
military	objectives	in	Article	52	of	Additional	Protocol	I),	I	believe	that	civilian	deaths	and	vital	
infrastructure	can	be	spared.	On	April	12,	1999,	NATO	aircraft	struck	a	civilian	passenger	train	
traveling	across	the	Leskovac	railway	bridge	(ICTY	2000).	The	target	of	the	strike	was	the	bridge	
that	was	allegedly	being	used	as	part	of	the	re-supply	route	for	Serbian	forces	in	Kosovo.	While	
mistakes	can	be	made	due	to	the	fallibility	of	humans,	the	description	of	the	events	published	
by	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	reiterate	the	neglect	for	civilian	life:	
After	launching	the	first	bomb,	the	person	controlling	the	weapon,	at	the	last	instant	
before	impact,	sighted	movement	on	the	bridge.	The	controller	was	unable	to	dump	the	
bomb	at	that	stage	and	it	hit	the	train,	the	impact	of	the	bomb	cutting	the	second	of	the	
passenger	coaches	in	half.	Realising	the	bridge	was	still	intact,	the	controller	picked	a	
second	aim	point	on	the	bridge	at	the	opposite	end	from	where	the	train	had	come	and	
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launched	the	second	bomb.	In	the	meantime	the	train	had	slid	forward	as	a	result	of	the	
original	impact	and	parts	of	the	train	were	also	hit	by	the	second	bomb	(2000).	
	The	strike	should	have	been	called	off	immediately	following	the	discovery	of	the	passenger	
trains	movements,	but	the	follow	up	strike	on	the	bridge	reaffirms	the	neglect	on	the	behalf	of	
NATO	operators.		
	 In	May	1999,	NATO	aircraft	struck	the	Chinese	Embassy	in	Belgrade,	resulting	in	the	
death	of	three	Chinese	citizens,	many	more	injuries,	and	extensive	damage	to	the	embassy	and	
surrounding	area.	The	embassy	had	been	falsely	identified	as	the	headquarters	of	the	Yugoslav	
Federal	Directorate	for	Supply	and	Procurement	(ICTY	2000).	The	negligence	of	NATO	
intelligence	again	resulted	in	civilian	casualties,	and	in	this	case,	the	death	of	Chinese	
diplomats.	At	the	time	of	the	strike,	the	Chinese	had	stood	firm	against	the	NATO	intervention	
in	Kosovo	and	contributed	to	it	being	an	illegal	intervention	by	their	unwavering	stance.	
Ultimately,	the	U.S.	issued	a	formal	apology	to	the	Chinese	government	and	the	families	of	
those	affected,	but	the	damage	was	already	done.	
	 Another	notable	incident	that	resulted	in	civilian	deaths	was	the	bombing	of	the	Korisa	
Village	in	May	1999.	Approximately	80	civilians	were	killed	when	NATO	dropped	ten	bombs	on	
a	Serbian	refugee	camp	(2000).	Unlike	the	previous	incidents	I	examined,	the	U.S.	stood	by	their	
attack	due	to	the	close	proximity	of	a	true	Serbian	military	camp	and	Command	Post.	With	the	
confirmed	presence	of	military	facilities	before	and	after	the	attack,	NATO	validated	the	strike.	
As	the	bombing	campaign	concluded,	many	reports	agree	that	an	estimated	495	civilians	died	
due	to	NATO	strikes,	with	almost	a	thousand	wounded	(2000).	However,	with	civilian	deaths	
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being	viewed	as	collateral	damage,	and	“unclear	laws”	regarding	the	course	of	action	during	
intervention,	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	did	not	press	charges	on	the	basis	of	war	
crimes	and	NATO’s	campaign	was	documented	as	a	success.		
	 I	disagree	with	this	conclusion	because	of	the	loss	of	civilian	life	due	to	negligence.	To	be	
a	successful	campaign	of	humanitarian	intervention,	I	argue	that	the	humanitarian	crisis	cannot	
be	worsened	as	a	result	of	the	intervention.	The	NATO	missiles	and	warplanes	were	
untouchable	by	the	Serbian	forces,	they	did	not	have	the	capability	to	defend	against	the	more	
advanced	weaponry.	U.S.	officials	acknowledged	the	likelihood	that	the	bombings	would	lead	
to	further	Albanian	victimization	because	they	were	more	vulnerable	on	the	ground	than	those	
dropping	bombs	from	the	sky.	The	NATO	campaign	would	end	without	a	single	combatant	
casualty.	However,	the	campaign	directly	caused	the	refugee	crisis	in	the	region	and	when	the	
bombing	ended,	the	violence	did	not.	As	Serbian	forces	withdrew	from	Kosovo,	the	Kosovars	
began	reverse	discrimination	against	the	Serbs	still	present	in	the	providence.		
	 Following	the	campaign,	Kosovo	became	a	protectorate	of	NATO	and	peace	keeping	
troops	were	set	up	in	the	region.	Although	NATO	had	intervened	on	behalf	of	the	ethnic	
cleansing	and	oppression,	they	apparently	turned	a	blind	eye	when	the	KLA	began	attacking	
Serbs	remaining	in	Kosovo.	According	to	an	agreement	from	June	1999,	NATO	would	“establish	
and	maintain	a	secure	environment	for	all	citizens	of	Kosovo”	but	during	this	occupation	
“between	60	and	90	percent	of	Serbs	and	Roma	left	Kosovo”	due	to	“KLA	harassment,	home	
burnings,	and	killings	(Herman	2000).”	During	this	time	as	a	protectorate,	Kosovo	remained	
legally	part	of	FRY,	but	authority	rested	with	the	Albanians	and	KLA.	Whilst	this	violence	
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ensued,	NATO	made	no	attempt	to	re-intervene	on	the	humanitarian	rights	of	the	Serbs	who	
were	left.		
	 I	have	established	and	argued	that	to	have	a	successful	humanitarian	intervention	it	
must	be	legal,	prevent	civilian	causalities,	and	establish	a	stable	government.	UN	Charter	
identifies	state	sovereignty,	and	the	necessity	of	approval	for	military	campaigns	as	two	crucial	
components	of	international	law.	By	acting	without	UN	Security	Council	approval,	NATO’s	
campaign	was	illegally	undertaken	and	directly	violated	the	sovereignty	of	FRY.	The	negligence	
of	NATO	officials	led	directly	to	the	deaths	of	hundreds	of	civilians,	mostly	Serb	civilians,	
without	repercussions.	While	the	establishment	of	peacekeeping	troops	in	the	region	was	a	
successful	attempt	to	establish	order	following	the	intervention,	they	failed	to	continue	
protecting	the	Serb	civilian	minority	population.	In	regards	to	my	third	criteria,	stable	
governance,	I	do	conclude	that	NATO’s	actions	established	a	secure	government	in	the	sense	
that	the	governing	bodies	were	stable.	The	intervention	in	Kosovo	began	and	ended	in	1999,	
but	they	would	not	receive	full,	and	still	contested,	independence	until	2008.			
Conclusion	
	 After	applying	my	criteria	for	success	to	the	NATO	intervention	in	the	former	Yugoslavia,	
I	have	concluded	that	the	campaign	failed	to	be	humanitarianly	successful.	I	draw	this	
conclusion	from	the	high	civilian	causalities	as	a	result	of	the	bombing.	In	my	opinion,	NATO	
forces	failed	to	protect	the	lives	of	civilians,	caused	a	refugee	crisis	for	the	surrounding	
countries,	and	acted	without	Security	Council	approval	making	their	campaign	illegal.		
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Chapter	Three:	Libya		
Libya’s	history	is	constructed	through	foreign	rulers.	The	Arabs	conquered	Libya	in	the	
600s,	and	during	the	16th	century	it	became	part	of	the	Turkish	empire.	Libya	remained	part	of	
the	Turkish	empire	until	the	Italians	invaded	in	1911,	and	the	Turks	surrendered	the	northern	
African	territory	in	1912	(Lambert	2016).	Driven	by	a	fascist	regime,	Italy	moved	from	
controlling	the	coast	of	Libya	to	all	of	Libya	by	1932.	Following	the	end	of	WWII,	Libya	was	
controlled	by	the	British	and	French,	with	a	UN	decree	that	it	must	be	independent	by	January	
1st,	1952(UN	1950).	Libya	became	an	independent	state	under	the	rule	of	King	Muhammad	Idris	
al	Sanusi	on	December	24th,	1951.	Initially,	Libya	was	impoverished,	but	its	economic	fortunes	
turned	around	when	oil	was	discovered	in	1959.	The	oil	brought	wealth	to	the	country	and	
Libya	became	a	major	oil	producer	by	the	mid-1960s	(BBC	2017).		
A	new	era	of	politics	began	in	Libya	following	the	1969	coup.	A	group	of	military	officers,	
led	by	Muammar	Gaddafi,	abolished	the	monarchy	and	seized	control	of	the	state.	Colonel	
Gaddafi	immediately	introduced	socialisms	by	nationalizing	most	of	the	economic	activity	of	the	
state,	including	the	prosperous	oil	industry	(2017).	Gaddafi	outlined	his	political	theology	in	his	
book,	Green	Book,	combining	socialist	and	Islamic	theories	while	rejecting	parliamentary	
democracy	and	political	parties	(Pargeter	2012).	As	the	head	of	state,	Gaddafi	exercised	
virtually	total	control	over	major	government	decisions	and	declared	a	“cultural	revolution”	in	
1973	(2012).	This	“revolution”	lead	to	the	formation	of	“people’s	committees”	in	schools,	
hospitals,	universities,	workplaces	and	administrative	districts	(Pargeter	2012).	Gaddafi	is	also	
responsible	for	changing	the	official	name	from	Libyan	Arab	Republic	to	the	Great	Socialist	
People’s	Libyan	Arab	Jamahiriya.		
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Foreshadowing	Intervention:	
Commonly	referred	to	as	the	Arab	Spring,	a	wave	of	pro-democracy	protests	and	
uprising	ran	through	the	Arab	world	between	2010	and	2011.	The	movement	challenged	the	
extremely	authoritarian	regimes	in	the	region	as	demonstrators	expressed	their	political	and	
economic	grievances.	The	Arab	Spring	took	hold	in	some	form	in	almost	all	Arab	countries,	
however	it	truly	shook	the	governments	of	Egypt,	Yemen,	Tunisia,	Syria,	and	Libya.	
Characterized	by	a	series	of	revolutions,	regime	changes,	and	civil	wars,	the	Arab	Spring	
affected	each	country	differently.	The	protests	began	as	peaceful	and	civilian	based,	but	took	a	
dark	turn	when	states	fired	back	with	oppression	and	violence.	Gaddafi	and	his	regime	had	one	
of	the	most	violent	and	bloody	responses	to	the	protests.		
Protests	began	in	Benghazi	in	February	2011	following	the	arrest	of	a	human	rights	
activist,	and	are	violently	met	by	the	Libyan	security	forces	and	Gaddafi	loyalists.		Gaddafi	calls	
on	the	military	to	carry	out	strikes	against	protestors,	but	after	two	Libyan	fighter	pilots	
defected,	several	high-level	Libyan	officials	and	diplomats	also	defected	(Ham	2012).	The	
protestors	are	able	to	take	control	of	Benghazi	as	well	as	most	of	eastern	Libya,	while	Gaddafi	
relied	on	extreme	violence	in	an	attempt	to	regain	control.	By	March,	the	UN	Security	Council	
approves	sanctions	against	the	regime	and	the	International	Criminal	Court	begins	an	
investigation	into	crimes	against	humanity.	Amidst	the	chaos,	the	Transitional	National	Council	
(TNC)	declares	itself	the	sole	voice	of	Libya	(2015).	
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NATO	Intervention	
NATO	intervention	in	Libya	began	after	Western	leaders	called	on	Gaddafi	to	accept	his	
“responsibility	to	protect”	and	his	subsequent	failure	to	do	so	(Economist	2011).	Instead	of	
protecting	his	citizens	against	human	rights	violations,	Gaddafi	was	reportedly	instructing	the	
attacks	on	the	civilians	involved	in	the	protests.	In	March	2011,	NATO	implemented	the	UN’s	
policy	to	prevent	the	supply	of	“arms	and	related	materials”	to	Libya	by	launching	a	navy	force	
to	operate	throughout	the	Mediterranean.	NATO	took	sole	control	of	the	operations	in	Libya	
and	began	taking	military	action	to	protect	the	civilian	population.	Operation	Unified	Protector	
was	undertaken	based	on	three	principles:	“a	sound	legal	basis,	a	strong	regional	support,	and	a	
demonstrable	need	(2011).”	The	allied	forces	were	working	with	the	UN,	the	League	of	Arab	
states,	and	other	international	organizations	to	ensure	the	best	possible	plan	of	action.	The	
three	main	objectives	of	Operation	Unified	Protector	are:	
1. Enforcing	an	arms	embargo	in	the	Mediterranean	Sea	to	prevent	the	transfer	or	
arms,	related	materials	and	mercenaries	to	Libya.	
2. Enforcing	a	no-fly	zone	to	prevent	aircrafts	from	bombing	civilian	targets.	
3. Conducting	air	and	naval	strikes	against	military	forces	involved	in	attacks	or	
threatening	to	attack	Libyan	civilian	and	civilian	populated	areas.	
On	April	14th,	2011	NATO	allies	and	their	six	operational	partners	agreed	that	OUP	would	not	
end	until	the	attacks	on	civilians	ended,	the	Gaddafi	regime	withdrew	its	military	to	bases,	and	
the	regime	allowed	safe	access	to	humanitarian	air	for	the	Libyan	population.	
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	 As	in	Kosovo,	the	alliance	operated	through	airstrikes,	more	than	26,000	sorties	with	
42%	being	strikes	(NATO	2015).	OUP	was	operating	with	21	ships	and	250	aircraft	at	its	height	
and	allowed	for	the	safe	passage	of	humanitarian	assistance	provided	by	the	UN	and	other	
NGOs.	The	operation	was	carried	out	in	accordance	with	UN	Security	Council	Resolution	1973,	
that	outlined	the	basis	for	intervention	in	Libya	(2015).	Unlike	in	Kosovo,	the	UN	approved	the	
intervention	into	Libya.	The	seven	months’	operation	ended	in	October	2011	following	the	
death	of	Muammar	Gaddafi.		
Critiques		
Operations	in	post-Gaddafi	Libya	have	been	a	source	of	endless	critiques.	Currently,	
Libya	is	a	failed	state	with	little	international	support	or	guidance,	many	militias	vying	for	
power,	and	no	clear	path	for	the	future.	There	are	many	factors	that	contributed	to	the	lasting	
destabilization	of	the	country	including	un-humanitarian	motives	of	intervention,	the	lack	of	
effort	to	stabilize	before	withdrawing,	and	the	consequences	of	enforcing	the	western	
philosophy	of	“responsibility	to	protect.”	
Operation	Unified	Protector,	was	less	of	an	intervention	effort	and	more	of	regime	
toppler.	The	actions	of	NATO,	including	the	embargo	and	no	fly	zone,	were	directed	at	
destabilizing	the	regime	and	forcing	Gaddafi	from	power.	While	the	U.S.	has	a	policy	of	
supporting	democracy	and	pro-democracy	movements,	the	consequences	of	destabilizing	Libya	
should	have	been	foreseen	and	taken	into	account	prior	to	involvement.	The	immediate	end	of	
OUP	following	the	death	of	Gaddafi	highlighted	the	gapping	hole	in	NATO’s	plan	for	
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intervention;	they	wanted	Gaddafi	out	of	power,	but	were	not	concerned	for	the	future	of	
Libya.	Best	said	in	Alan	Kuperman’s	essay,	Lessons	from	Libya:	How	not	to	intervene:	
Libya’s	2011	uprising	was	never	peaceful,	but	instead	was	armed	and	violent	from	the	
start.	Muammar	al-Qaddafi	did	not	target	civilians	or	resort	to	indiscriminate	force.	
Although	inspired	by	humanitarian	impulse,	NATO’s	intervention	did	not	aim	mainly	to	
protect	civilians,	but	rather	to	overthrow	Qaddafi’s	regime,	even	at	the	expense	of	
increasing	harm	to	Libyans	(Kuperman	2015).	
The	overthrow	of	Gaddafi	lead	to	more	civilian	causalities,	whereas	the	protests	and	violence	
before	the	toppling	of	the	regime	was	between	rebels	and	Gaddafi’s	enforcers.	As	the	country	
fell	into	chaos,	civilians	lost	all	order	and	protection,	and	new,	unforeseen	problems	arose.		
	 The	lack	of	effort	to	stabilize	Libya	before	withdrawing,	and	the	consequences	of	
destabilization	have	affected	more	than	just	Libyans.	Due	to	the	lack	of	a	strong,	central	
government,	or	any	functioning	government,	Libya	has	“the	largest	flow	of	modern	African	
migration”	as	people	try	to	make	their	way	illegally	into	Europe.	Libya	is	a	known	haven	for	
traffickers	and	smugglers	who	extort	desperate	refugees	and	offer	unsafe	passage	to	the	
southern	coasts	of	Europe.		
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The	figure	above	outlines	key	travel	paths	of	refugees	and	other	migrants	who	are	pouring	into	
the	destabilized	Libya	to	access	the	Mediterranean.	The	NATO	intervention,	and	quick	
withdrawal,	turned	this	North	African	country	into	a	hodgepodge	of	vying	militias,	war	ragged	
civilians,	and	those	trying	to	seek	a	better	life	in	Europe.	
	 NATO	and	other	partners	called	on	Gaddafi	to	honor	the	doctrine	of	R2P,	emphasizing	
with	the	notion	that	if	a	state	does	not	protect	it	citizens	from	mass	human	rights	violations,	
the	international	community	is	responsible	to	step	in.	In	the	case	of	Libya,	Gaddafi	and	his	
regime	were	hard	lining	protestors,	who	evolved	into	rebels	of	the	regime,	and	anyone	
suspected	of	sympathizing	with	the	movement.	Extreme	violence	and	oppression	in	response	to	
the	Arab	Spring	was	seen	in	Tunisia	and	Egypt,	but	unlike	Libya,	these	countries	were	able	to	
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ousts	their	regimes	without	international	intervention.	Now,	many	countries	that	experienced	
the	Arab	Spring	are	under	new,	authoritarian	regimes	that	are	also	repressive,	or	in	total	
disarray.	In	Syria,	the	Arab	Spring	turned	into	a	civil	war	with	the	hopes	of	NATO	intervention	to	
oust	Bashar	al-Assad.	However,	following	the	disaster	in	Libya,	NATO	did	not	intervene	in	Syria	
and	Syria	has	be	torn	apart	by	civil	war	ever	since.		
	 Although	NATO	intervened	with	strict	agenda	of	protecting	civilians,	following	the	death	
of	Gaddafi	and	the	end	of	OUP,	the	civilians	of	Libya	live	in	fear	due	to	the	continuous	factional	
fighting.	There	are	two	distinct	political	groups	vying	for	power,	and	four	armed	militias	
wreaking	havoc.	Power	in	Libya	is	now	split	between	the	east,	Tobruk,	and	the	west,	Tripoli.	In	
the	east,	the	government	is	ran	by	the	House	of	Representatives,	who	elected	Prime	Minister	
Abdullah	al-Thinni,	and	is	backed	by	Egypt	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates	(EFCR	2015).		Tripoli,	a	
city	in	western	Libya,	is	the	home	of	the	General	National	Congress,	a	house	of	representatives	
that	formed	in	reaction	to	the	relocation	of	the	Libyan	HOR,	and	its	own	prime	minister,	Omar	
al-Hassi	(2015).	Each	views	the	other	as	illegitimate	and	therefore	lacking	true	authority,	but	
the	true	power	in	Libya	belongs	to	Libya	Dawn	and	Haftar’s	Dignity	(2015).	The	power	of	
western	prime	minister	Khalifa	Ghwell,	successor	of	Hassi,	is	second	to	the	paramilitary	alliance	
of	armed	groups	that	exist	in	the	region	(2015).	The	government	of	al-Thinni	is	endorsed	by	the	
Dignity	operation.	The	Dignity	operation	has	a	centralized	command	under	Abdul	Razzaq	al-
Nadhuri,	but	tensions	arise	between	al-Nadhuri	and	other	eastern	officials	over	strategy,	
supplies,	and	future	plans	for	Libya.	While	these	groups	fight	over	political	control,	armed	
groups	reign	terror	on	all	of	Libya.	There	are	a	dozen	rebel	groups	in	Libya,	each	with	its	own	
agenda	and	weapons	base.	Most	notable	are	Libya	Dawn,	Libya	Shield,	Islamic	State,	and	Ansar	
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al-Sharia,	and	these	groups	have	been	known	to	harm	civilians	in	the	crossfires	(EFCR	2015).	
	
The	figure	on	the	previous	page	outlines	the	different	areas	of	Libya,	who	they	are	controlled	
by,	and	their	influence.	The	government	set	up	in	eastern	Libya	is	viewed	internationally	as	the	
government	of	Libya,	but	is	still	viewed	as	a	falling	government	as	the	country	has	yet	to	re-
unify	and	bring	peace	and	stability.		
	 An	important	distinction	that	is	often	left	out	of	the	analysis	of	the	events	that	led	to	
intervention	in	Libya	is	the	difference	between	civil	war	and	human	rights	violations.	Many	
critiques,	including	David	Gibbs,	emphasize	the	violence	that	was	inflicted	by	the	rebels,	not	the	
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regime.	Arguably,	the	rebels	fighting	the	regime	were	the	ones	who	instigated	a	violent	
response	from	Gaddafi,	rather	than	him	firing	on	protestors	first.	Also,	there	is	a	difference	
between	the	peaceful	protests	and	armed	rebels	besieging	government	buildings.	NATO	
intervention	into	Libya	served	as	a	means	to	topple	their	former	ally	and	give	the	rebels	the	
upper	hand	in	the	conflict.	Gibbs	describes	the	previous	relationship	between	the	West	and	
Gaddafi,	and	their	readiness	to	intervene	to	overthrow	him	after	an	extensive	relationship	that	
included	exchanging	military	equipment	and	intelligence	collaboration	(Gibbs	2011).	
Throughout	his	essay,	Gibbs	argues	that	the	West	intervened	in	Libya	on	the	basis	of	self-
interest	in	the	oil	industry	and	an	opportunity	to	show	Western	military	might.		
	 NATO	intervention	in	response	to	their	perceived	responsibility	to	protect	the	civilian	
population	of	Libya	has	led	to	the	chaos	that	causes	more	harm	for	the	civilian	populations.	
While	Libya	is	currently	a	failed	state,	dipping	low	on	the	human	rights	index,	and	a	source	of	
refugee	crisis,	Western	leaders	are	not	preparing	for	a	re-stabilization	operation.		
Application	of	thesis	
	 Unlike	Kosovo,	many	scholars	and	politicians	agree	that	NATO’s	intervention	into	Libya	
was	a	failure.	However,	they	draw	that	conclusion	because	unlike	in	Kosovo,	the	U.S.	did	
experience	casualties	as	a	result	of	this	intervention.	Often	referred	to	by	the	location	of	the	
attack,	Benghazi,	this	attack	resulted	in	the	death	of	four	American	diplomats.	This	attack,	and	
the	deaths	that	occurred	during,	caused	U.S.	public	support	for	intervention	in	Libya	to	
plummet	and	attributed	to	why	peacekeepers	were	not	left	in	the	region.	In	Kosovo,	
peacekeeping	troops	helped	stabilize	governance,	but	in	Libya	operations	ceased.	The	attacks	
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on	the	U.S.	government	facilities	were	conducted	by	a	branch	of	the	rebel	forces	that	NATO	had	
intervened	on	behalf	of.		
	 The	chaos,	and	failed	governance	of	Libya	post-Gaddafi	has	led	to	a	failed	state	in	Libya	
and	regional	disarray.	NATO	failed	to	facilitate	a	stable	governance	and	because	of	that	they	do	
not	meet	one	of	my	three	criteria	for	successful	intervention.	I	argue	that	eliminating	the	initial	
source	of	conflict	and	human	rights	violations	is	not	enough	to	ensure	the	prolong	safety	of	the	
civilian	population.	By	withdrawing	from	Libya	before	stabilizing,	the	civilian	population	has	
endured	the	terror	of	the	different	rebel	factions	fighting	throughout	the	country.	The	death	
toll	has	climbed	continuously	since	the	official	end	of	NATO’s	campaign,	but	the	humanitarian	
crisis	that	exists	now	has	not	enticed	the	UN	or	NATO	to	intervene	again.		
	 Intervention	in	Libya	also	failed	to	protect	the	civilian	populations.	NATO	strikes	
attributed	to	civilian	deaths,	and	although	the	numbers	vary	depending	on	the	source,	the	
Human	Rights	Watch	report	examines	eight	strikes	that	resulted	in	the	death	of	72	civilians.	
However,	civilian	deaths	due	to	NATO	intervention	are	higher	than	those	caused	by	Gaddafi’s	
oppression	of	the	protestors.	While	it	was	difficult	finding	documentation	regarding	the	
amount	of	deaths	that	resulted	due	to	the	backlash	of	Gaddafi’s	region	following	the	Arab	
Spring	protests,	there	was	plenty	of	evidence	and	stipulation	that	Gaddafi	did	not	attack	the	
protestors	first	nor	instigated	more	violence.	The	violence	that	has	now	been	caused	by	the	
rebels	has	been	more	harmful	than	the	attempts	for	Gaddafi	to	regain	control	of	the	country.		
		 In	order	to	remove	the	negative	stigma	associated	with	humanitarian	intervention,	I	
argue	that	interventionists	need	to	be	wary	of	the	consequences	of	negligence	and	avoid	
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causing	civilian	casualties.	According	the	Human	Rights	Watch	report,	the	strikes	that	resulted	
in	civilian	deaths	were	surrounded	with	ambiguity	and	incomplete	information.	Instead	of	
brushing	off	the	civilian	causalities	as	collateral	damage,	NATO	should	be	held	responsible	for	
the	damage	that	was	not	military	objectives.		
	 With	Libya	being	a	failed	state,	continuous	civil	war,	and	a	refugee	crisis	that	has	added	
to	the	chaos,	the	humanitarian	intervention	was	a	failure	and	an	example	of	what	not	to	do.		
Conclusion	
There	is	little	scholarly	debate	about	whether	or	not	intervention	into	Libya	failed	
miserably.	While	I	draw	the	same	conclusion,	I	do	so	through	my	criteria	and	understanding	of	
what	it	means	to	carry	out	a	successful	humanitarian	intervention	campaign.	While	the	NATO	
forces	caused	less	civilian	casualties	upfront,	their	actions	destabilized	the	country	and	caused	a	
continuing	humanitarian	crisis.	Currently,	there	are	several	rebel	factions	vying	for	power,	
smugglers,	traffickers,	and	terrorist	have	made	their	permanent	home	in	Libya,	and	civilians	
lives	are	torn	apart	by	the	never	ending	violence.	For	these	reasons,	the	NATO	campaign	failed	
to	meet	two	of	my	three	criteria	for	a	successful	intervention.		
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Chapter	four:	Conclusion	
Throughout	this	thesis	I	have	argued	that	to	carry	out	a	successful	humanitarian	
intervention	it	must	be	legal,	prevent	civilian	causalities,	and	facilitate	the	creation	of	a	stable	
government.	By	adhering	to	my	criteria,	I	believe	future	interventions	would	have	less	negative	
consequences	because	it	would	limit	destruction,	be	internationally	supported,	and	lead	to	the	
emergence	of	a	new,	stable,	and	successful	government.		
To	ensure	legality,	any	force,	whether	it	be	an	alliance	such	as	NATO,	or	a	single	state	
intervening	in	another,	must	receive	UN	Security	Council	approval.	Intervening	in	a	sovereign	
state	without	Security	Council	approval	is	illegal	under	international	law,	and	acting	outside	the	
law	sets	the	precedent	that	states	can	invade	simply	on	the	pretense	of	human	rights	
violations.	By	abiding	by	the	international	laws	established	under	the	UN	Charter,	I	believe	it	
would	lead	to	further	international	cooperation	because	all	military	interventions	would	be	
viewed	unilaterally	as	legitimate.		
Adhering	to	the	legal	precedent	already	established	prevents	the	slippery	slope	effect	in	
regards	to	humanitarian	intervention.	If	other	countries	adopted	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	
they	would	be	able	to	invade	their	foes	with	less	restraints.	While	the	U.S.	has	its	notion	of	
human	rights	violations	and	points	fingers	at	other	state’s	extreme	practices,	many	states	
believe	the	U.S.	violates	human	rights	by	allowing	the	death	penalty.	If	NATO	continues	to	
violate	sovereignty	under	the	pretense	of	human	rights,	they	could	be	opening	the	door	for	
other	states	to	do	the	same.	In	order	to	prevent	this	slippery	slope,	NATO	needs	to	be	restricted	
by	the	international	laws	they	claim	to	be	defending.		
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Limiting	civilian	causalities	is	included	as	one	of	my	criteria	for	success	because	causing	
death	to	noncombatants	while	waging	war	to	prevent	further	humanitarian	crisis	is	
counterproductive	and	delegitimizes	the	campaign.	By	acting	with	restraint	and	caution,	I	
believe	the	intervening	force	will	not	cause	more	harm	than	necessary	because	they	will	be	
thinking	of	the	long-term	ramifications	of	their	actions.	I	also	believe	that	if	civilian	lives	are	
prioritized,	diplomatic	means	of	peaceful	solutions	will	become	more	important	and	utilized.		
Finally,	I	think	the	true	determinate	of	success	is	the	long-term	stabilization,	success,	
and	prosperity	of	the	nation	that	was	intervened	in.	By	aiding	the	new	government	in	creating	
and	administering	law	and	order,	the	humanitarian	mission	will	end	with	an	effort	to	prevent	a	
new	crisis.	If	efforts	had	been	made	to	stabilize	Libya,	thousands	of	refugees	would	not	be	
pouring	into	the	coasts	of	Europe.	By	facilitating	the	growth	and	integrity	of	new	governments,	
NATO	is	expanding	its	network	of	allies	while	honoring	the	goal	of	their	missions:	protecting	
human	rights.	Without	a	government	monitoring	and	protecting	the	human	rights	of	its	
populations,	chaos	and	terror	ensues.		
Not	to	be	confused	with	state	building,	my	vision	for	the	future	of	humanitarian	
intervention	is	peace	keeping	forces,	whether	supplied	by	the	UN,	NATO	or	an	individual	
country,	being	present	during	the	uneasy	transition	from	revolution	to	rebuilding.	History	
shows	repeatedly	that	after	a	revolution,	chaos	erupts	as	competing	factions	vie	for	power.	
Instead	of	operating	a	military	campaign	to	topple	the	oppressor	and	then	immediately	
withdrawing,	I	believe	that	those	who	intervened	on	behalf	of	human	rights	violations	should	
remain	for	a	minimum	of	6	months	to	act	as	a	mediator,	protector,	and	neutral	presence	in	
case	of	further	violence.	I	do	not	envision,	or	support,	the	notion	of	these	peace	keeping	forces	
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swaying	the	restructuring	of	a	state.	Instead,	I	support	the	idea	of	preventing	the	chaos	and	
disarray	present	in	Libya	from	occurring	following	future	revolutions.		
The	topic	of	humanitarian	intervention,	and	limiting	the	damages	it	inflicts,	is	
increasingly	important	as	the	world	becomes	more	globalized.	Through	advanced	
communication	networks	and	the	interdependence	of	states,	a	humanitarian	crisis	is	become	
less	a	regional	issue	but	a	global	one.	Currently,	the	world	is	seeing	the	effects	of	a	regional	
humanitarian	crisis	on	the	international	community.	The	refugee	crisis	that	began	in	the	Middle	
East	and	Africa	is	now	affecting	the	policies	of	countries	around	the	world.	As	civil	wars	and	
violent	regime	changes	continue	to	shape	developing	countries,	I	believe	redefining,	limiting,	
and	reimagining	humanitarian	intervention	is	important.		
The	Syrian	Civil	War	is	presently	ripping	apart	Syria	and	negatively	affecting	its	
neighboring	countries.	As	debate	swirls	regarding	the	future	course	of	action,	instead	of	relying	
on	traditional,	flawed,	methods	of	humanitarian	intervention,	I	believe	a	new	alternative	should	
be	considered.	Through	my	analysis	of	Kosovo	and	Libya,	I	concluded	that	brute	military	
strength	against	a	lesser	developed	country	in	the	name	of	human	rights	is	counterproductive.	
The	large-scale	bombs	that	are	routinely	dropped	cause	substantial	damage	to	the	
infrastructure	of	the	countries,	ruin	urban	centers,	cause	causalities,	and	force	people	out	of	
their	homes.		
Moving	forward,	and	looking	back,	I	think	humanitarian	intervention	should	be	less	
militarized	and	more	humanitarian.	Before	states	used	their	militaries	to	protect	human	rights,	
the	ICRC	was	working	to	aid	and	protect	all	victims	of	war.	I	suggest	that	civilian	entities	are	
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better	for	providing	humanitarian	aid	and	assistance	and	should	be	used	rather	than	military	
campaigns.	I	understand	the	need	for	protection,	and	I	would	not	except	an	aid	operation	to	be	
conducted	without	any	protection	unit,	but	those	units	should	only	be	utilized	as	a	
protectionary	caution,	instead	of	as	an	invading	force.	By	coming	into	an	already	conflicted	area	
peacefully,	instead	of	inflicting	more	damage,	the	humanitarian	workers	would	be	there	to	
prevent	it.		
I	believe	that	the	future	of	humanitarian	intervention	does	not	coincide	with	use	of	
military	force,	but	rather	actual	humanitarian	relief.	There	will	always	be	conflict	in	the	world,	
but	in	order	to	limit	the	scope	and	damage	of	these	conflicts	there	must	be	a	new	course	of	
action.			
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